# 4.2.18.2.5 TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP — `-man` ↔ `-cas` diff 报告
> **交付形态说明**：本报告随专家交付包分发——`-man`/`-cas` 脚本包 zip 与 190server HTML 执行日志已内联至 `packages/`、`evidence-html/`，相应路径已相对化；TTR、spec_intl、caseir 等仓内留痕仍为生成机原始路径（未随包）。

- 生成时间：2026-10-08 22:57:10 ｜引擎：holiday-blk5/0.1｜配对状态：`PAIRED`
- 分母口径：卡侧 61 之一

## 1. 配对与包

| 侧 | 包/源 | sha256 | 源类型 | 入口用例 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `-man` | 4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP-man.zip | `9183b187bc39c6e880cbcb75df2e6fea11938aedf7b6b82cbe9a9ad4bba63950` | zip | TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_Nominal_With_EventID_in_CtxParams1 |
| `-cas` | 4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP-cas.zip | `42319058dbd09262d654d9b0ba515ac53b95c40ac2a79befdc924fbed7741e3e` | zip | — |

- man 源路径：`../../packages/man/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP-man.zip`
- cas 源路径：`../../packages/cas/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP-cas.zip`
- 上游来源：{"man_ledger": true, "cas_ledger": true, "naming_map": true, "html_probe": true, "man_package": true, "cas_package": true}
- 适用性：naming-map=`C002` ["C002", "C002", "C002", "C002", "C002"]；caseir=`C002`

## 2. 执行摘要（双方 job/终态）

| 侧 | 终态/计划 | 备注 | ErrorCount | job_id | 业务状态 | TTR | 诊断包 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `-man` | `ok` | `_ok` 复用（结构 A1-A7 PASS；`_ok` run 无厂商错误行） | 0 | `20260909_011652_ok:2e01361d139f43f6ac529620903e42c4` | — | `/Users/yuhu/cas/原料/切片/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP/logs/20260909_011652_ok/result/ESIM_TEST_SGP_23/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_Nominal_With_EventID_in_CtxParams1.ttr` | `—` |
| `-cas` | `REUSE_GREEN` | 产物 placed（B5，20261006_121509_ok）；本轮不重跑 | 0 | `cfebfd9c052143b9a016d3112daf1b68` | — | `/Users/yuhu/cas/产物/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP/logs/20261006_121509_ok/result/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_02_Nominal_TC_2_Test_Sequence.ttr` | `—` |
- cas 块4账本：decision=`REUSE_GREEN`；route=`native_N0`；live 事件 0 条（4.6 波次进行中；以块4终版账本为准）
- cas 证据来源分层：`REUSE_GREEN` → 历史复用（prior evidence，本轮未重跑）

## 3. HTML 执行日志状态

- `-man`：**NATIVE**（`../../evidence-html/4.2.18.2.5/man/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_Nominal_With_EventID_in_CtxParams1.html`；sha256 `4203363b307aa6ea9d4e2790553bc8c9222b89ab58f97879a41fd8d06cbe0f25`；101063 bytes）
- `-cas`：**NATIVE**（`../../evidence-html/4.2.18.2.5/cas/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_02_Nominal_TC_2_Test_Sequence.html`；sha256 `2c88202aac3ab89647a7859dd711983d1760c7793101b6cf47e2dbda3995a4fa`；26609 bytes）
- 纪律：原生缺失 → `HTML_UNAVAILABLE` 显式阻断（附探针结论）；派生件仅标 `DERIVED_NOT_NATIVE`，不冒充原生。

## 4. L1 脚本/依赖/命名差异（源文件闭包级）

- 闭包规模：man 34 文件 / cas 82 文件；同名 31（字节同 30，内容异 1）
- 同名内容异：`Import/TestCase_SGP_23.js`
- man-only 文件 3：`ESIM_TEST_SGP_23.UCE`, `ESIM_TEST_SGP_23.sol`, `MANIFEST.json`
- cas-only 文件 51：`Import/CapInfo.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase_CSC.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase_LoadProfile_via_bip.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase_Local_Management.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase_Non_Telecom_Profile.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase_Performance.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase_PressureTest.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase_ProfileFormatTest_V_2_3_1.js`, `Import/ExecuteTestCase_ProfileServicesListTest.js` …
- 注：man 包＝切片最小闭包（`script/` 投影）；cas 包＝slice_native 全工程投影（厂商参照闭包＋生成体）。闭包规模差为打包形态差异；同名文件字节差集中于 `Import/TestCase_SGP_23.js`（TC 入口本体）。

### 4.1 入口代码对照

- 行数：man 131 / cas 358；字符：man 5193 / cas 33205
- man 顶层调用 Top：[["TestStepStart2", 14], ["GenHexData", 6], ["TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_02_Nominal_With_IMEI_and_EventID_in_Device_Capabilities", 2], ["check_Applicability_of_tests_RSP_SGP23_test", 2], ["TraceStart", 2], ["ResetCard", 2], ["TS_TERMINAL_CAPABILITY_cmd", 2], ["TS_MANAGE_CHANNEL_OPEN", 2], ["TS_SELECT", 2], ["RSP_profile_load_procedure_LPAd", 2]]
- cas bind 调用：[["checkData", 64], ["sendApdu", 7], ["resetAndAtr", 1], ["runToSteadyState", 1], ["sendTerminalProfile", 1], ["manageChannelOpen", 1]]

| 方言映射对 | 命中数 |
|---|---|
| ResetCard() ↔ bind.resetAndAtr() | 2 |
| TS_*_cmd() ↔ bind.* 命令封装 | 6 |

<details><summary>unified diff（截断预览）</summary>

```diff
--- man
+++ cas
@@ -1,130 +1,357 @@
-// slice of Import\TestCase_SGP_23.js - cases: TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_Nominal_With_EventID_in_CtxParams1 + TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_02_Nominal_With_IMEI_and_EventID_in_Device_Capabilities (extracted verbatim)
-
-function TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_Nominal_With_EventID_in_CtxParams1()
-{
-	if(!Card_Have_ECC_Cert)
-		return;
-
-	//测试入口条件
-	if(!check_Applicability_of_tests_RSP_SGP23_test("C002"))
-		return;
-
-	tracenamestr = "测试目的：执行AuthenticateServer指令，CtxParams1中没有EventID";
-	curDis.TraceStart(sno++,tracenamestr);
-
-	curDis.TestStepStart2(stno++,"复位；");
-	ResetCard();
-
-	curDis.TestStepStart2(stno++,"读卡器向卡片发送Terminal Capability命令；");
-	TS_TERMINAL_CAPABILITY_cmd();
-
-	curDis.TestStepStart2(stno++,"读卡器向卡片发送MANAGE_CHANNEL命令，打开辅助逻辑通道；");
-	TS_MANAGE_CHANNEL_OPEN();
-
-	curLogicChannel = 1;
-
-	curDis.TestStepStart2(stno++,"读卡器向卡片发送SELECT命令，选择ISD-R；");
-	TS_SELECT("Select ISD",ISD_R_AID,"9000");
-
-	curDis.TestStepStart2(stno++,"读卡器向卡片发送 StoreData命令，执行GetEuiccInfo1Request；");
-	pkId_CI_ForVerification = pkId_CI_ECDSA_BRP;
-	pkId_CI_ForSigning = pkId_CI_ECDSA_BRP;
-	var Profile_load_procedure = new RSP_profile_load_procedure_LPAd(PROFILE_OPERATIONAL1_DATA);
-	Profile_load_procedure.ICCID = ICCID_OP_PROF1;
-	Profile_load_procedure.ES10b_GetEUICCInfo1();
-
-	curDis.TestStepStart2(stno++,"读卡器向卡片发送 StoreData命令，执行GetEuiccChallengeRequest；");
-	Profile_load_procedure.ES10b_GetEUICCChallenge();
-
-
-	curDis.TestStepStart2(stno++,"读卡器向卡片发送 StoreData命令，执行AuthenticateServerRequest；");
-	var DeviceCapabilities1 = new DeviceCapabilities();
-	DeviceCapabilities1.gsmSupportedRelease = "050000";
-	DeviceCapabilities1.utranSupportedRelease = "080000";
-	DeviceCapabilities1.cdma2000onexSupportedRelease = "010000";
-	DeviceCapabilities1.cdma2000hrpdSupportedRelease = "010000";
-	DeviceCapabilities1.cdma2000ehrpdSupportedRelease = "020000";
-	DeviceCapabilities1.eutranSupportedRelease = "020000";
-	DeviceCapabilities1.contactlessSupportedRelease = "090000";
-	DeviceCapabilities1.rspCrlSupportedVersion = "020100";
-
-	var DeviceInfo1 = new DeviceInfo();
-	DeviceInfo1.tac = "00000000";
-	DeviceInfo1.deviceCapabilities = DeviceCapabilities1.GenHexData();
-
-	var CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication1 =new CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication();
-	CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication1.matchingId = "30373339392D42474837452D5438373739";
-	CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication1.deviceInfo = DeviceInfo1.GenHexData();
-
-	ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication=CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication1.GenHexData();
-
-	Profile_load_procedure.DPauthInforObj.D_key = SK_S_SM_DSauth_ECDSA_BRP;
-	Profile_load_procedure.DPauthInforObj.Cert = CERT_S_SM_DSauth_ECDSA_BRP;
-	Profile_load_procedure.ES10b_AuthenticateServer();
-
-	RecoverCard();
+// Author: 卡思Cas智能体
+// Date: 20261004-022634
+// Function: （purpose 原文未由 SGP.23 该 TC 提供，corpus vacuum 登记）TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP，Test Sequence #01-#02 Nominal（本 TC 全部 2 条 Test Sequence 合并展开），适用性 C002。
+// Test points: ICH-IC1-K1-C1 ATR_present；ICH-IC1-K2-C2 FCP_Template；ICH-IC1-K2-C4 SW
+//   ICH-IC1-K3-C4 SW；ICH-IC1-K4-C4 final SW；ICH-IC2-K1-C4 SW；ICH-IC2-K1-C3 CHANNEL_NUMBER extracted
+//   ICH-IC2-K2-C4 SW；S1-C1 SW；S1-C2 R_EUICC_INFO1 outer tag
+//   S1-C2 R_EUICC_INFO1 required members present；S1-C3 CI PK lists share at least one key id
+//   S2-C1 SW；S2-C2 R_CHALLENGE outer tag；S2-C2 R_CHALLENGE required members present
+//   S2-C2 tagOfeuiccChallenge；S2-C2 lengthOfeuiccChallenge；S4-C1 SW；S4-C2 structure_ok
+//   S4-C3 transactionId echo；S4-C4 serverChallenge echo；S4-C5 sig_verify；S4-C6 ctxParams1 echo
+//   S4-C2 R_AUTHENTICATE_SMDS authenticateResponseOk structure；S4-C5 euiccSignature1 verify
+//   S5-C1 SW；S5-C2 R_EUICC_INFO1 outer tag；S5-C2 R_EUICC_INFO1 required members present
+//   S5-C3 CI PK lists share at least one key id；S6-C1 SW；S6-C2 R_CHALLENGE outer tag
+//   S6-C2 R_CHALLENGE required members present；S6-C2 tagOfeuiccChallenge
+//   S6-C2 lengthOfeuiccChallenge；S8-C1 SW；S8-C2 structure_ok；S8-C3 transactionId echo
+//   S8-C4 serverChallenge echo；S8-C5 sig_verify；S8-C6 ctxParams1 echo
+//   S8-C2 R_AUTH_SMDS_IMEI authenticateResponseOk structure；S8-C5 euiccSignature1 verify
+// 本函数由 CaseIR 4.2.18.2.5 编译生成（4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP-20261004_022634，SGP.23 v1.16 × SGP.22 v2.7）：字节权威=CaseIR，非誊录黄金脚本。
+// Value-free template: every data byte is injected from CaseIR fields; no scaffold globals (see docs/speconly/compile-symbol-migration.md).
+// 适用性 C002：编译期门，运行时由 harness 环境前置承担。
+function TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_02_Nominal_TC_2_Test_Sequence() {
+    var bind = curBind;
+
+    // IC head inline (initial_conditions → PROC_EUICC_INITIALIZATION_SEQUENCE, K row 1)：RESET（K 语料机械展开）
+    var s9 = bind.resetAndAtr();
+    bind.checkData("ICH-IC1-K1-C1 ATR_present", "1", s9.atr_hex !== "" ? "1" : "0");
+
+    // IC head inline (initial_conditions → PROC_EUICC_INITIALIZATION_SEQUENCE, K row 2)：SELECT_MF（K 语料机械展开）
+    // FCP outer tag not materialized from clause: tag-face asserted only when corpus fixes the tag byte (e.g. TS 102 221 FCP '62').
+    var s10 = bind.sendApdu("00", "A4", "00", "04", "3F00", "00", "9000");
+    bind.checkData("ICH-IC1-K2-C2 FCP_Template", "1", s10.resp.length > 0 ? "1" : "0");
+    bind.checkData("ICH-IC1-K2-C4 SW", "9000", s10.sw);
+
+    // IC head inline (initial_conditions → PROC_EUICC_INITIALIZATION_SEQUENCE, K row 3)：TERMINAL_CAPABILITY_LPAd（K 语料机械展开）
+    var s11 = bind.sendApdu("80", "AA", "00", "00", "A9058100830107", null, "9000");
+    bind.checkData("ICH-IC1-K3-C4 SW", "9000", s11.sw);
+
+    // IC head inline (initial_conditions → PROC_EUICC_INITIALIZATION_SEQUENCE, K row 4)：TERMINAL_PROFILE（K 语料机械展开）
+    var steady12 = bind.runToSteadyState(function () {
+        return bind.sendTerminalProfile("FFFFFFFF7F9D00DFBF00001FE2000000C7EB0000000168005000000000000200", "9000");
+    });
+    bind.checkData("ICH-IC1-K4-C4 final SW", "9000", steady12.final.sw);
+
+    // IC head inline (initial_conditions → PROC_OPEN_LOGICAL_CHANNEL_AND_SELECT_ISDR, K row 1)：MANAGE_CHANNEL_OPEN（K 语料机械展开）
+    // CHANNEL_NUMBER extraction and dynamic CLA rebinding are CasBind internal state (chaining rule; no generated-code re-implementation).
+    var s13 = bind.manageChannelOpen("9000");
+    bind.checkData("ICH-IC2-K1-C4 SW", "9000", s13.sw);
+    bind.checkData("ICH-IC2-K1-C3 CHANNEL_NUMBER extracted", "1", s13.chan !== null ? "1" : "0");
+
+    // IC head inline (initial_conditions → PROC_OPEN_LOGICAL_CHANNEL_AND_SELECT_ISDR, K row 2)：MTD_SELECT（K 语料机械展开）
+    // CLA = bound channel (cla_rule) and <L> length binding are CasBind internal state (chaining rule; no generated-code re-implementation).
+    var s14 = bind.sendApdu(null, "A4", "04", "00", "A0000005591010FFFFFFFF8900000100", null, "9000");
…（差异行超限，共 489 行，此处截断）
```

</details>
### 4.2 UCE/命名对照

- man：`ESIM_TEST_SGP_23.UCE`；入口 [('TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_Nominal_With_EventID_in_CtxParams1', 'TC_EUICC_ES10B.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP', 'Import\\\\ExecuteTestCase_SGP_23.js(TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_Nominal_With_EventID_in_CtxParams1)')]；参数 {"ReaderName": "Identiv SCR35xx USB Smart Card Reader 0"}
- cas：`TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP.uce`；入口 [('TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_02_Nominal_TC_2_Test_Sequence', 'TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP', 'Import\\\\ExecuteTestCase_spec.js(TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_02_Nominal_TC_2_Test_Sequence)')]；参数 {"ReaderName": "Identiv SCR35xx USB Smart Card Reader 0"}

## 5. L2 步骤/APDU/step_map 差异（结构化对齐）

- 命令计数：man 47 / cas 40；精确对齐 10，核心（CLA·INS·P1·P2·Lc）同 5，man-only 32，cas-only 25

| # | `-man` | `-cas` | 对齐 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `@RESET` | `@RESET` | exact |
| 2 | `80AA000007A9058100830137` | `80AA000007A9058100830107` | core_same |
| 3 | `0070000001` | `0070000001` | exact |
| 4 | `01A4040010A0000005591010FFFFFFFF8900000100` | `01A4040010A0000005591010FFFFFFFF8900000100` | exact |
| 5 | `01C0000021` | `01C0000021` | exact |
| 6 | `81E2910003BF2000` | `81E2910003BF200000` | core_same |
| 7 | `81E2910003BF2E00` | `81E2910003BF2E0000` | core_same |
| 8 | `01C0000000` | `01C0000000` | exact |
| 9 | `01C0000000` | `01C0000000` | exact |
| 10 | `01C0000000` | `01C0000000` | exact |
| 11 | `01C0000000` | `01C0000000` | exact |
| 12 | `01C0000000` | `01C0000000` | exact |
| 13 | `01C0000000` | `01C0000000` | exact |
| 14 | `81E2910003BF2000` | `81E2910003BF200000` | core_same |
| 15 | `81E2910003BF2D00` | `81E2910003BF2E0000` | core_same |
| — | man-only: `0070000000`, `01C00000A9`, `01C0000015`, `81E21100FFBF388203273049801024EBB462C9BB…C075253`, `81E21101FF5054455354310B3009060355040613…8AE0108`, `81E21102FFF01DEF548ED9859714DD48300E0603…9A13080`, `81E291032F0400000000A1288003050000810308…3020100`, `01C0000063`, `@RESET`, `00A40004023F00`, `00C0000020`, `80AA000007A9058100830137` | | |
| — | | cas-only: `00A40004023F0000`, `00C0000020`, `8010000020FFFFFFFF7F9D00DFBF00001FE20000…0000200`, `801200000F`, `801400000C810301250082028281830100`, `81C00000A9`, `81C0000015`, `01E21100FFBF3882032F30518010284FDEF88A06…40A0C00`, `01E21101FF0752535054455354310B3009060355…B258A00`, `01E21102FFFB61388B3FF2EE6A61E2C44D72300E…7452D00`, `01E29103375438373739A130800400000000A128…2010000`, `01C000006A` | | |

## 6. L3 规范字段/Expected/REQ/通过条件差异

- spec：/Users/yuhu/cas/原料/切片/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP/spec_intl/SGP.23-v1.16_4.2.18_AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP.md（风格：mapping）；caseir：`/Users/yuhu/cas/产物/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP/caseir_materialized_gate.json`

spec_intl 为人工核订映射表风格（规范步骤 ↔ 厂商脚本实现 ↔ 实跑结果）：

| 规范步骤 | man 脚本实现 | man 实跑结果 |
|---|---|---|
| IC1 PROC_EUICC_INITIALIZATION_SEQUENCE | `Card_Have_ECC_Cert` 门禁（L5）→ C002 门禁（L9）→ `ResetCard()`（L16）→ `TS_TERM | 通过（步骤 1-2＝APDU3/6，复位成功＋TC SW=9000 在案） |
| IC2 PROC_OPEN_LOGICAL_CHANNEL_AND_SELECT_ISDR | `TS_MANAGE_CHANNEL_OPEN()`（L22）→ `TS_SELECT("Select ISD",ISD_R_AID,"90 | 通过（步骤 3-4＝APDU11/17，通道 01 开＋ISD-R SW=9000） |
| 1 #GET_EUICC_INFO1（CI 列表核验：BRP 同根 CI 在场） | **BRP CI 注入** `pkId_CI_ForVerification/ForSigning=pkId_CI_ECDSA_BRP`（L | 通过（步骤 5＝APDU23，R_EUICC_INFO1 SW=9000；BRP CI 键 id `C0BC70BA…` 在响应在案） |
| 2 #GET_EUICC_CHALLENGE | `ES10b_GetEUICCChallenge()`（L37） | 通过（步骤 6＝APDU29，R_CHALLENGE SW=9000） |
| 3 InitiateAuthentication 输入组装（BRP CI＋#CERT_S_SM_DSauth_ECDSA 同根＋EventID） | DeviceCapabilities 八字段（L41-49）→ DeviceInfo tac=00000000（L51-53）→ CtxPa | 通过（步 4 请求载荷 `BF38820327…8311 736D6470706C75732E746573742E636F6D`（APDU3 |
| 4 `MTD_STORE_DATA_SCRIPT(#AUTHENTICATE_SMDS)` → #R_AUTHENTICATE_SMDS＋SW=0x9000 | `ES10b_AuthenticateServer()`（L63，BF38 请求链式 81E2 发送） | 通过（步骤 7＝APDU35 起请求链（APDU37-62）逐包 SW=9000；响应 `BF3882065E`（APDU63 起链式 GE |
| 4 断言 a：EUICC_SIGNATURE1 用 #PK_EUICC_ECDSA 验签 | `Euicc_RSP_Verify`（过程库，含证书链） | 通过（**EUM证书验证成功**（APDU73）＋**EUICC证书验证成功**（APDU74）＋**卡片返回签名数据正确**（APDU75 |
| 4 断言 b：euiccSigned1 中 S_TRANSACTION_ID 与请求相同 | 过程库内部＋raw 字节比对（规范步骤列复核） | 通过（**字节级**：请求 `8010 24EBB462C9BBA21B314D91E1CE805723`（APDU37/41）↔ 响应 e |
| 4 断言 c：S_SMDS_CHALLENGE 与请求相同 | 同上（SGP.22 L9078：serverChallenge [4] Octet16，tag 84） | 通过（**字节级**：请求 `8410 EB3EA9D2C05F2E8D5BA1B671D19BD34A`（APDU37/41）↔ 响应 e |
| （收尾，非规范步骤） | `RecoverCard()`（L65） | 通过（Transaction 2：MemoryReset（BF3403800100/0101 析取在案 APDU135）→profile 列 |

cas CaseIR 步骤/检查：

| 步 | 动作 | checks | REQ |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | [Seq#01] MTD_STORE_DATA (#GET_EUICC_INFO1) | ["S1-C1", "S1-C2", "S1-C3"] | [] |
| 2 | [Seq#01] MTD_STORE_DATA (#GET_EUICC_CHALLENGE) | ["S2-C1", "S2-C2"] | [] |
| 3 | [Seq#01] Step4 输入准备（InitiateAuthentication）：<S_TRANSACTION_ID>、<EUICC_ | [] | [] |
| 4 | [Seq#01] MTD_STORE_DATA_SCRIPT(#AUTHENTICATE_SMDS) | ["S4-C1", "S4-C2", "S4-C3", "S4-C4", "S4-C5", "S4-C6"] | ["RQ24_008", "RQ26_005", "RQ26_006", "RQ26_008", "RQ26_012", "RQ26_013", "RQ26_029", "RQ26_034", "RQ31_025", "RQ31_078", "RQ43_002", "RQ45_006", "RQ45_026", "RQ45_026_1", "RQ57_094", "RQ57_095", "RQ57_096", "RQ57_097", "RQ57_098", "RQ57_099", "RQ57_101", "RQ57_102", "RQ57_103", "RQ57_104", "RQ57_105", "RQ57_106", "RQ57_107", "RQ57_108", "RQ31_046", "RQ31_047", "RQ31_048", "RQ31_049", "RQ31_050", "RQ31_051", "RQ31_053", "RQ31_054", "RQ31_055"] |
| 5 | [Seq#02] MTD_STORE_DATA (#GET_EUICC_INFO1) | ["S5-C1", "S5-C2", "S5-C3"] | [] |
| 6 | [Seq#02] MTD_STORE_DATA (#GET_EUICC_CHALLENGE) | ["S6-C1", "S6-C2"] | [] |
| 7 | [Seq#02] Step4 输入准备（InitiateAuthentication）：<S_TRANSACTION_ID>、<EUICC_ | [] | [] |
| 8 | [Seq#02] MTD_STORE_DATA_SCRIPT(#AUTH_SMDS_IMEI) | ["S8-C1", "S8-C2", "S8-C3", "S8-C4", "S8-C5", "S8-C6"] | ["RQ24_008", "RQ26_005", "RQ26_006", "RQ26_008", "RQ26_012", "RQ26_013", "RQ26_029", "RQ26_034", "RQ31_025", "RQ31_078", "RQ43_002", "RQ45_006", "RQ45_026", "RQ45_026_1", "RQ57_094", "RQ57_095", "RQ57_096", "RQ57_097", "RQ57_098", "RQ57_099", "RQ57_101", "RQ57_102", "RQ57_103", "RQ57_104", "RQ57_105", "RQ57_106", "RQ57_107", "RQ57_108", "RQ31_046", "RQ31_047", "RQ31_048", "RQ31_049", "RQ31_050", "RQ31_051", "RQ31_053", "RQ31_054", "RQ31_055"] |

### 6.1 充分性分析（启发式，不作最终裁定）

- cas：`NO_MECHANICAL_GAPS`（全步有检查=True；REQ 全覆盖=False；ErrorCount==0=True）
- cas 物化核对（启发式旁证，权威见下行 attestation）：声明检查 11 项 / 生成体 checkData 64 次 / S 标号重合 11 / 计数缺口 0 / 形态 `FULL`；执行面 `PASS`（计数缺口须结合绑定层隐含断言核验，非直接判缺陷）
- **cas 编译器自证（check_attestation，同批构建）**：声明 None = js 30 + binding 0 + gap 0；缺口判定以本行为权威（启发式计数仅旁证）
- man：映射行 10；TTR 期望/实际回声 68；厂商工具内置审计（TTR 期望/实际回声行为证据）；脚本字节级充分性不可完全外部验证
- cas 信息步（无线上断言义务）：[3, 7]
- REQ 声明面 vs caseir 引用面差异（3 项，非等价缺口判定）：['**RQ26_029 在列内出现两次为规范原文 verbatim**', '§4.2.18.1 全集', '同 4.2.18.2.6 表 200）']
- caseir open_items：
  - <S_TRANSACTION_ID> / <S_SMDS_CHALLENGE> / <S_SMDS_SIGNATURE1> / <EUICC_CI_PK_ID_TO_BE_USED> / <EUICC_CHALLENGE> / <EUICC_SIGNATURE1> 全部运行时动态值，一律 dynamic/null
  - #CERT_S_SM_DSauth_ECDSA 证书字节来自 SGP.26 捆绑，不在输入包
  - E_tc 两序列 REQ 列中 RQ26_029 出现两次，已去重转录
  - 每条 Test Sequence 执行后须按 2.2.2 执行 clean-up（CU）恢复 Common Initial State
  - R2 残余占位：命令数据已按 S22_auth_srv 闭合为模板字面量；<S_TRANSACTION_ID>/<EUICC_CHALLENGE>/服务器 challenge/签名 为 G_annexB 运行时动态值，serverCertificate 字节在 SGP.26 捆绑不在输入包，DeviceInfo 内层标签与 SubjectKeyIdentifier/Certificate 编码标签语料缺席（保守占位），各 <L_*> 长度随动态值定，分块 P1/P2 逐块值运行时定
  - CtxParams1 CHOICE 备选项按语料（S22_auth_srv :71）无显式标签 → 承载 SEQUENCE 标签 30 编码；若 SGP.22 原文该备选带显式标签则为语料漂移点，回原件裁定

## 7. 分类结论（封闭枚举）

| 轴 | 计数 | 说明 |
|---|---|---|
| `SCRIPT_DIALECT` | 111 | 闭包文件差：man-only 3 / cas-only 51；命令序列差：man-only 32 / cas-only 25 |
| `GEN_DIFF` | 3 | REQ 覆盖缺口：['**RQ26_029 在列内出现两次为规范原文 verbatim**', '§4.2.18.1 全集', '同 4.2.18.2.6 表 200）'] |

- 置信度：heuristic；需人工复核：False

## 8. 证据路径

- man 包：`../../packages/man/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP-man.zip`
- man TTR：`/Users/yuhu/cas/原料/切片/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP/logs/20260909_011652_ok/result/ESIM_TEST_SGP_23/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_Nominal_With_EventID_in_CtxParams1.ttr`
- cas 包/源：`../../packages/cas/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP-cas.zip`
- cas TTR：`/Users/yuhu/cas/产物/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP/logs/20261006_121509_ok/result/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP/TC_eUICC_ES10b_AuthenticateServer_SM_DS_BRP_01_02_Nominal_TC_2_Test_Sequence.ttr`
- spec_intl：`/Users/yuhu/cas/原料/切片/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP/spec_intl/SGP.23-v1.16_4.2.18_AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP.md`
- caseir：`/Users/yuhu/cas/产物/4.2.18.2.5-TC_eUICC_ES10b.AuthenticateServer_SM-DS_BRP/caseir_materialized_gate.json`
- step_map：`—`

